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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L.B. FOSTER COMPANY, a ) 
Pennsylvania Corporation, , 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
NELSON BROTHERS CONSTRUC-
TION COMP ANY, a Utah Corpo-
ration, and INDUSTRIAL IN-
DEMNITY COMP ANY, a Corpo-
ra ti on, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No.10613 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE 
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THIS COURT. 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
'l'his is an action by the plaintiff, who was a mate-
rial snpplier of a Subcontractor, to recover for mate-
rials furnished and used in the construction of a portion 
of Interstate Highway I-15, located in North Lehi, Utah. 
Tli0 Snhrontractor was Bountiful Materials & Con-
strurtion Company, hereinafter referred to as "Bo-
maro.'' 
1 
The General Co11trado1· ·was ~ elson Brothers Coll-
struction Company, hereinafter referred to as the "de-
fendant Nelson Brothers.'' 
DISPOSrrION BY LOvVER COURT 
This case was tried by the Court without a jury in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County. The Court found 
the issues in favor of the plaintiff. 
Said the Court : 
"That the plaintiff is entitled to reeover un<ler 
the Indemnity and Guaranty Agrerment intro-
duced in evi<lence, (Ex. P-1) and that the plain-
tiff is entitled to a ju<le,"lllent for the amount 
prayed for, plus attorneys' fees as provided by 
the Bar Schedule." (R. 49) 
There was no issue on the amount owing to plaintiff for 
materials furnislwcl ($2,752.90), since this sum was 
agreed at the Pre-Trial conference. 
Plaintiff and clef endant also agreed to a bide by the 
Bar Schedule for the assessment of attorneys' fees (R. 
43). Accordingly, judgment ·was entered for plaintiff 
for the sum of $2,752.90, plus $3()3.83 interest, plus 
$620.94 attorneys' fees, and plus costs of court (R. 53). 
STATE.'.\lENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff (Respondent), as the pr0vailing party he-
] ow, is entitled to the benefit of a review of the eviclcner 
in the light most favorable to it. \V r shall not attempt 
here to set forth all of the evi<10nee hearing on ea('h iss1w 
of fact. 
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Plaintiff's statement, however, is intended to demon-
s! rate that the Court's ~fomorandum Decision (R. 49) 
arnl thP Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, are 
:imply supported hy competent evidence, and that the 
.Tw1gnwnt represents a just determination of the con-
troYers~'. 
Defendant, Nelson Brothers Construction Company, 
was m':anlrd a General Contract by the State of Utah to 
co11f.Jrnct Highway Project No. IG-15-6 (20)-277-3rd 
North, Lehi, Utah (Ex. P-1). In connection therewith 
<1rfern1ant Nelson Brothers entered into a Subcontract 
with BO:'.\L\CO, Inc., wherein BOMACO agreed to fur-
11isl1 mid install approximately 1,790 lineal feet of a1u-
minnm guard railing for said Interstate Project (Ex. 
P-4). B0~1ACO in turn purchased the said aluminum rail-
ing- from the plaintiff and used it in the performance of 
its Suhcontract with the defendant Nelson Brothers. 
After BO:\IACO hecam_e unable to pay, plaintiff brought 
t11is action to recover from defendant Nelson for the ma-
teria1s fnrnished and nsed on Nelson's Construction 
Project. 
:\f indfnl of the precarious financial position of BO-
:\f A CO, plaintiff wrote to defendant from Los Angeles, 
C1ilifornia, on June 10, 1063, as follows: 
''~el son Brothers Construction Company 
:i47 \Vest 16th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Subject: Project #IG-15-6(20)277 3rd 
Contract North Lehi, Utah 
Gentl0rn0n: 
\Ye have heen re<iuest0cl hy your Subcon-
trnctor, Bountiful l\1aterials and Construction 
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Company, to furnish aluminum bridge rail mate-
rials in cmmection with your ~Hate Contract, Proj-
ect No. 1G-15-6(20)277-3rd Contract, North Lehi, 
Utah. 
In consideration of our drlil'f~ring aluminum 
bridge rail to Bomaco, Inc., on your jobsite, we ask 
that you guarantee payment of our im-oiee in ac-
cordance with the terms of your Subcontract with 
Bomaco, Inc., and that ll"P be afforded prof Pcfio11 
under your bond. 
Your consideration in executing and rrturning 
one copy of this letter to us in the self-ad<lressecl 
envelope will be very much appreciated. Should 
you have any questions, please call the under-
signed collect. 
Agreed as above. 
V erv trulv YOlll'S . .. . ' 
L.B. FOSTER, INC. 
By /s/ K. D. l\IcClelland 
K. D. l\fcC:lelland 
N"ELSON BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY 
By /s/ Reuben G. Skogerboe 
Reuben G. Skogerhoe, Superintendent 
Date: October 17, 1963" 
(Ex. P-1) (Emphasis supplied) 
The lower court a'\rnrded judgment to the Plaintiff, 
L. B. Foster Company, on the basis of this said letter 
agreement. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
'rHE COURT'S RULING THAT PLAINTIFF 
\VAS NOT TRANSkCTING BUSINESS WITH-
IN THE STATE OF UTAH WHICH WOULD 
REQUIRE REGISTRATION UNDER THE 
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT WAS 
AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
This Court has spoken many times on the subject of 
what ('011stitutes "doing business" in Utah by a foreign 
corpora ti on. 
On the subject of ''doing business,'' the facts, simply 
stated, are these: Bomaco, defendant's Subcontractor, 
placed its order for aluminum bridge railing from plain-
1 iff for the X orth Lehi Project by telephone to plaintiff's 
Los Angeles office (R. 126). Plaintiff in response to the 
order had the bridge railing shipped from Pittsburg-Ii 
PP1ms:dYania (R. 16) and Carnegie, Pennsylvania (R. 
l~l) to Bomaco 's yard in Salt Lake City, Utah, in care of 
(lefrll(lant Nelson. There is no dispute that all of the 
materials ordered by Bomaco for this said highway proj-
(•d wrre shipped from states other than Utah (R. 100). 
Plaintiff's salesmen infrequently solicited orders in 
Utah -- on~y hrn or three times a year (R. 91). Plain-
1 iff <fol not maintain ag-ents or dealers in Utah nor did 
f)la i 11 ti ff ha ,.e an office or need for an office in the State 
,,f Ptah (TI. 125). Plaintiff had nothing to do with the in-
c;1allr1tion of said matrrials after they were shipped to th<· 
.ioh (R 101 ), hut did prepare shop drawings and did fah-
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ricate the railing in Pittsburgh for delivery to the ~orth 
Lehi Construction Project (R. 101 ). 
Defendant Nelson urges that some sheet piliug stored 
in Utah places plaintiff in the position of Qualification 
and Registration. None of the said piling stored in Utah 
·was used on the Xorth Lehi Project, and Shurtleff & }.n-
clrews, ·with whom the said piling was stored for the con-
,-enience of general contnictors, was in fact an irn1epern1-
ent contractor (R. 109). The record, l10wevt>r, is elem· 
that almost all of the piling waf-3 shipped into the State 
of Utah or throug-h the State in Interstate Commerce 
(R. 111, 112). 
Defendant Nelson's, witnesses testified at R. 145 and 
146, that the sheet piling was receiYed from outside Utah, 
and shipments were made to state's dher tlrnn Utah . 
. Again, at R. 153, defrrn1ant Nelson'R witness stated, tlwt 
of a total of seventeen transactions, thirteen were "ship-
ped out of state or rerei,-ed from out of state, and fonr 
·were shipped to or received within the state." 
In addition to the interstate shipment of piling to in-
dependent contrad:ors Shurtleff & Ancln_~\YS am1 to F. & 
B. Trurk Lines, it should be noted that plaintiff deals i11 
rails, splice bars, holts, nuts, spikes, frogs, swift.hrs, tie 
plates, rail braces, track, tools, '111 kinds of piping, 
H-Bearinv,, pjpe pilin~;, marine fenders, rnh11er dork 
fenders, pump cells, highway signs, nmie of ,,-11ieh an• 
stored in the Stat0 of Utah nor sold through clealers or 
ap;e11ts in the Rt ate of Utah (R. 141, JG~, 164-). 
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Defendant Nelson does not attack the validity of the 
agreement hetween plaintiff and Bomaco for the mate-
rials ordered and consumed on its job, but rather at page 
12 of its brief urges "this court to uphold states' rights 
to rompel compliance and should deny access to the courts 
111 th is case." (Emphasis added) 
Moreover, defendant Nels on does not contend the 
lrn1cmnity Agreement (Ex. P-1) was either void or void-
able for want of plaintiff's qualification in Utah. 
En~n so, the facts support the Interstate nature of 
plaiHtiff's business in Utah. Upon these facts, the court 
below follo-..ved the decision of East Coast Discount Cor-
]Jnratirm v. Reynolds, 7 Utah 2d 362, 325 Pac. 2d 853 . 
. \rnl the Court had this case clearly in mind at the trial 
of this said action. See the Court's comment with refer-
ence to this East Coast Discount Corporation case at 
Page 110 of the record. 
With reference to what constitutes doing business 
within the meaning of the Constitution of Utah, Article 
X, Section 9, see .~f arclwnt v. National Reserve Company 
of T'tah, 103 Utah 530, 137 Pac. 2d 332. 
Activities not considered to be transacting business 
'':ithin the Rtate of Utah are set forth in 16-10-102, Utah 
Co<le Annotated, under the Business Corporation Act. 
Among these are: 
(a) maintaining or def ending an~y action or suit ... 
( <·) (•ffc,dinQ; sales throngh independent contractors (such 
:1-.: tliP snles trmisaeted through Shurtleff & Andrews and 
7 
R & B Trueking Company relating to piling <llil)-); (f) 
soliciting or proenring orders, whethrr by mail or 
through employees or agents, or otherwise, when' such 
orders require accepta11ce "·ithont this State before 
hrcoming binding eontrarts (plaintiff <lid not han 
an office or an agency in the State of Utah for thP rrnr-
pose of acrepting orders in tl1is State); (i) transacting 
any business in Interstate Commerce. (Practically all of 
the business transacted hy plaintiff in Ftah 1\·a:, T11ter-
state, and the materials ordered from plaintiff was 
shipped in Interstate Commerce.) 
In the case of Parke Daris & Company v. Fift71 .711-
rlir'ial Distrirt C'o11rt, 93 Utah 217, 72 Pac. 2d 466, the 
Court ruled: 
"The soliciting of on1ers for goods h)' salesmen 
of for0ig11 eurporati011 and the shipment of goods 
into State pnrnuant to such orders, are in Inter-
state Commerce and do not constitute doin1~ bnsi-
nrss within the Rt ate of Utah." 
See also East Coast Discount Corporation v. Reyn-
olds, 7 Utah 2d 362, 325 Pac. 2d 853, in which the Court 
held that a foreign corporation which entered into con-
tracts with dealers in the State of Utah 1\·hich required 
it to send guarantees to consumers, adYertise<1 1hrongh 
circulars, shared newspaper adYertising expe11sP, fur-
nished a<lYertising mattPr, and send an a.gent 1Yhcn re-
quested, to assist the dealer in sales, was not "<10inf( 
husineRR'' for purposes of the statute; RincP these ads 
were incidental to thr entire Interstate charart0r of 
contracts. 
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The 1Jringi11g of a suit by a foreign corporation to 
s1·1·11re its legal rights is not "doing business" in the 
State of Utah. See George R. Barse Livestock Company 
, .. Rangr Valley Cattle Company, 16 Utah 59, 50 Pac. 
()30; Home Breicing Company of Chicago Il eights v. 
A111rrican Chemical and Ozokerite Company, 58 Utah 
21D, 198 Pac. 170; r: eneral Motors Acceptance C'orpora-
tirm \'. JJ1md, 60 Utah 247, 208 Pac. 502. 
Def en clan t Nelson for "doing business" relies on the 
case of Mud Control Laboratories v. Coi:ey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 
2()9 Pac. 2d 854. In this case, the Court construed 16-8-3 
Ftah Code Annotated (1953), setting out the disabilities 
of a non-complying foreign oorporation. Defendant 
N cl son, apparently overlooked the fact that 16-8-3 was 
repraled by the Legislature in 1961, when the Utah Bus-
iness Corporation Act was enacted. It should be noted, 
lin\H":C'r, that in the Mud Control Case, contrary to the 
fnets in the instant case, the materials sold by Mud 
Control were shipped into Utah and were there dis-
bursed by Mud Control. The Utah Business Corpora-
tion Act 16-10-102 liberalizes the registration require-
ments of foreign corporations, and specifically classifies 
t hr 0xemptions 'd1ich come ·within the facts of this case. 
Ree also East Coast Discount Corporation v. Reynolds, 
s11pra, in which the Court said: 
'' ... ~ferely entering into contracts requiring for-
ei 1.rn corporations to perform within state acts, 
whirh were part of and incidental to entire Inter-
state character of rontracts did not constitute 
(1oim~· husi11rss for rrnrposes of statute.'' 
1'o s0t the rr('ord strni.~ht clefendant's voluntar~­
:;1 :1 t 0 m"11t rlt 1)(1 !~·r 12 of its brief must he answered. De-
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fendauts' statement is quoted as follows:" Prcs1111wl;l!J, a 
substantial sum has accrued to the State of Utah mid to 
the County of Salt Lake for license taxes, sales taxes from 
sales and lease transactions conducted in the State, in-
come taxes from the income derived from said sales and 
rentals, and the property taxes on i1wentory maintained 
in the State." At page 129 of the record, plaintiff's 
representative testified that he did not know whether 
the company paid inventory, income or sales tax in Utah. 
Defendant Nelson's counsel, it would appear, deliber-
ately injected an assumption which this Court in its 
judicious .. wisdom ·will denounce. EYen though the sul1-
ject of taxes is entirely irreYelant to the issu0s in this 
case, it would seem that the proper forum for defcnclm1t 
N e1son to make its charge or complaint, if it has one, is 
the State Tax Commission of Utah. Defendant did not 
produc0 any evidence as to whether or not .. plaintiff paid 
taxes in the State of Utah. 
In conclusion and in <lefense of <lefendant Nelson's 
plea that the plaintiff should he denied access to the 
Courts in Utah, we refer to 16-10-102 (a) Utah Code 
Annotated, Utah Business Corporation Act, which spe-
cifically permits maintaining or defe11di11g any action or 
suit or administrative or arbitration proceeding, or 
affecting the settlement thereof, or the settlement of 
claims or disputes without having to register in the 
State of Utah. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT DEFENDANT, NELSON BROTHERS 
CONSTRUCTION COMP ANY, WAS INDEBT-
ED rro PLAINTIFF UNDER COUNT II OF 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
Defendant Nelson's argument to this point turns on 
the authority of its superintendent Reuben Skogerboe, 
to bind the defendant on an Indemnity-Guaranty Agree-
ment (Ex. P-1, supra). 
Having received the benefit of the materials fur-
nished and used on its construction project, clef end ant 
Nelson, for the first time and only after the law suit was 
filed, took the position that Skogerboe had no author-
ity to bind the defendant, Nelson Brothers. The Court 
properly concluded that Superintendent Skogerboe had 
the necessary authority, based upon the following: 
1. Plaintiff's (L. B. Foster) letter, dated June 
10, 1963 (Ex. P-1), was transmitted to defend-
ant (Nelson Brothers Construction Compan,y), 
requesting indemnification and protection un-
der defendant Nelson's bond on Project IG-15-6 
(20)277-3rd Contract, North Lehi, Utah. De-
fendant Nelson ref erred this letter to its su-
perintendent, Reuben G. Skogerboe, who in 
turn signed the document (R. 95), (R. 114, 
115, 117), on October 17, 1963, and forwardcrl 
the original to Plaintiff, L. B. Foster Com-
pany. It should he noted that Skog-erboe 
signed the letter as "superintendent," and 
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not as ".Job Superintendent." By referri11g 
this letter (Ex P-1) to Skogerboe for action 
defendant conferred upon Skogerboe the au-
thority to act. 
2. On April 28, 1964, plaintiff, (Foster) wrote to 
defendant (Nelson Brothers) (Ex. P-2) again 
requesting payment on said job, and a copy 
of this letter was directed to one of the prin-
cipals in the company, Mr. Orrin A. Nelson. 
Here again, Nelson Brothers referred this let-
ter to Reuben Skogerboe, Superintendent, who 
replied: 
"Payment of materials on this contract has 
not been received by us yet, payment should 
be received hy us approximately May 20, 
1964. \Ve will pa~- this to you and Bomaco 
jointly. Payment has just been received by 
us for material on the North Lehi Project, 
so IG-15-6 (20) 277 this will he mailed immc>-
diately. Sincerely yours, Reuben Skogerhoc, 
Superintendent." (Ex. P-2) 
3. Exhibit P-3 is a telegram from this same Reu-
ben Skogerboe stating that defendant, Nelson 
Brothers, will execute a Standard Sheet Piling 
Rental Agreement (R. 96, 97). 
4. The Subcontract Agreement between defend-
ant Nelson and Bomaco (Ex. P-4), was signed 
by Reuben G. Skogerboe, Superintendent, for 
and on behalf of Nelson Brothers Construction 
Company (R. 97). Also Ex. P-5 was referred 
to Skogerboe (R. 118). 
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5. Reuben G. Skogerboe, Superintendent, ·wrote 
to Bomaco on October 21, 1963 with reference 
to this said North Lehi Construction Project, 
in which he states that: 
''. . . I am returning one set of drawings. 
These dra.·wings do not have to be approved 
by the State, to do so now it would delay the 
project to such an extent you could not sup-
ply the material on time for delivery. The 
State on]y requires a Certificate of Compli-
ance v .. '1.1 h plans and specifications, plus a 
sample of handrail 2-feet Jong." (Ex. P-7) 
"\Vould the Court need more to prove Skogerboe 
had more than just superficial perfunctory jur-
isdiction of defendant Nelson's affairs? 
fi. On December 22, 1964, the firm Clyde, Mecham 
& Pratt "Trote to Emery Nelson of Nelson 
Brothers Construction Company. referring to 
the said Indemnity Agreement of .June 10, 1963. 
There was no answer recei,·ed to this letter, 
denying Skogerboe 's authority to sign the let-
ter of June 10, 1963 on behalf of Nelson Broth-
ers Construction Company (R. 27). 
7. In answer to an interrogatory at R. 29: 
"Q. Diel the defenclrrnt. N0Json Brothers 
Construction Compan~'. have a Subcontract 
with Bountiful "Makrials & Construction 
Company.'' 
Emery G. Nelson of def0ndant Nelson Company 
answered as the Secretary of the Corporation 
that a written Rubcontrnrt "·as in existence an<l 
furnished a rop)· of s:1icl Snhrontrnct with tlw 
Answers to Interrogatories at R. 31. It is not0(1 
that Skogerboe signe<l this document as "Sn-
perinternlc>nt" for defomlant N"Plson, and that 
Nels on did not ck11y Skogerhoe 's ant horit)· to 
sign ::-;aid S111)('011trart document, arnl morco\·er 
the materials fnrnisht>(l by plaintiff for per-
formance of said Snhrontrnrt ~were nse<l on the 
job (R. 98) and (R. ll 3). 
8. Attached to defendant Kel:-wn Compan:•;'s All-
swer to Interrogatories, Emery G. N c>lso11, S<·e-
retar)r of dc>fcmlant Nc>lson attaehc><l ehc•eks 
paid on said SnlK·ontract for tlH• materials fnr-
nishc>d b)· L. B. Foster Company through Bo-
maco. ThPsc checks sl1ow part paymc>nt of 1110 
account on the Subcontract exerutc•d h>· RenlJen 
Skogcrboc (Attached to R-31). 
9. On Seph•mber 28, rnfi.+, dc>fendant "t-~ elson \\TOt(• 
to plaintiff, stating that as of this elate, \\'e han• 
paid our Subcontractor, Bomitifnl Materials & 
Construction C1ompm1)·, $10,102.00 on the snh-
ject contracts. This reprc>scnts 90 per rent of 
the amount owed to them. The \Hiter of this 
letter stated: 
"We appreciate your informing llS of the un-
paid balance of Bomaco 's account, and will 
exert any pressure we can in getting- them to 
make payment at the earliest clnte r)Ossih1e. 
When we recein' final paymnt from the Stnt0. 
we will make a check in the amount of 
$1,128.00 payable to both you and Bomarn so 
14 
that you will be assured of receiving the final 
amount owed to Bomaco by us." (Emphasis 
added) 
There is no indication in this said letter at R. 
38, that defendant Nelson Company denies thr 
authority of Reuben Skogerboe to enter into 
the Subcontract Agreement with Bomaco. 
:\foreover, defendant Nelson Brothers states it 
will pay the ~1,128.00, 1rhicl1 has nnt been r701u.>, 
to date a11rl it is holding this sum contrary to 
the statcme11t in this said letter of 28 Septem-
ber 1.964. See R. 162, "·here Emery Nelson 
states llefendant Nelson is holding $1,128.00. 
Ser also R. 39, in which Bomaco, Inc., by a 
Jetter dated October 30, 1964, authorized 
<lefenclant (Nelson Brothers) Attention: Mr. 
Emery Nelson, to pay $1,282.50 to L. B. Fos-
ter and Bonntiful Material & Construction 
Company hy a joint check. Ancl, in answer to 
the Demm1d for Admissions at R. 40, defend-
ant (N rlson Brothers) admitted that the letter 
of Se1)h'mber 28, 1964, signed h>· Owe11 J. Lunt 
on he half of def emlant Nelson is g-enuine, Rnd 
that Bomaco 's letter, elated Octoher 30, 1964, 
\ms rrceiYrd hy defendant N0lson Brothers. 
10. Defendant Nelson stipnlatecl at pages 79 and 
80 of the rrconl that Renlwn Skofr0rhoe sig-11ed 
thP ~nhcontract AgTerrn0nt with Bomaco n11 1 
tlrnt Skogerhoe was n P,111wri11t0n<lrnt 1wer:nali-
fie<l ns snch with thr State of Ftah (R. 81 ). 
1 f) 
11. Plaintiff, at no time e\·er recei,·ed information 
from defendant Nelson that Reuben G. Skoger-
boe did not have authority to sign the Indem-
nity Agreement identified as Exhibit P-1 
(R. 93). 
12. Reuben Skogerboe testified that he had super-
\·ision of defendant N elsou 's '"'Ork and coordi-
nation of the work by general contractors arnl 
was an expediter of matrrials on the job (R. 
121). In this capacit~· he expedited materials 
furnished by plaintiff. 
13. Emery N elsou testified at R. 135, that Skogpr-
boe had authority to negotiate tlw terms of 
Subcontracts (R. 159). 
14. The Suhcoutract Agreement signed by SkogN-
hoe \YaS Rnhmit t<•d to the State Road Commis-
sion by df>fendant Nelson, as heing completely 
bona fide, and Nelson Brothers did not re-
nounce this said Suh-contract because of the• 
authority of Skog-erhoe (R. 161). 
"The liability of the principal (<lefendant Nelson) 
to a third person (plaintiff, Foster) upon n trm1sacti011 
conducted b.v an agent ( Skogerhoe) ma~· he based upon 
the fact that (a) agent was authorized; (h) the agent was 
apparently authorized; or ( c) the agent had a power 
arising from the agency relationship, and not dependent 
upon an authority or apparent authority." (Restatcme11f 
of thr Lmr of A.qency, Sec. 140.) 
"Although an agent or apparent agent does not 
under the n1les stated in Section 144-211 (disclosed or 
partially disclosed 1irincipal) have power to bind his prin-
cipal in a particular transaction, the transaction may 
11en•rtheless subject the principal to liability or to the 
loss of his interests where: (a) The principal has mis-
led or has failed to undeceive the third person; (b) the 
principal has benefited from the transaction." ... (Re-
statement of the Laio of Agency, Sec. 141.) 
"Upon ratification with knowledge of the material 
facts, the principal becomes responsible for contracts 
and conveyances made for him by one purporting to act 
on his account as if the transaction had been authorized, 
if there has been no supervening loss of capacity by the 
principal, or change in the law which would render ille-
gal the authorization or performance of such a transac-
tion." Restatement of the Law of Agency, Sec. 143.) 
''A disclosed or partially disclosed principal is sub-
.ird to liability upon contracts made by an agent acting 
within his apparent authority, if made in proper form 
nn<l with the understanding that the apnarent principal 
is a party. (ResfafPmPnf of the Law of A.qe11cy, 8ec.159.) 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEE IN CONNECTION 'WITH COUNT II OF 
THE COMPLAINT. 
Plaintiff served notice upon the defendants on the 
8th <lay of March, 1966, that plaintiff would ask the Court 
1 o amt>ncl the Pre-Tri al Ordrr at the commencrment of 
the trial on l\farch 11, 1966. 
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SinC'e the i8sne of attorneys' fee8 under Count II re-
volved upon an interpretation of th0 Indemnity Agn•0-
ment, and its relation to 14-1-8, Utal1 Code Arnwtated, the 
Court saw no prejudice to defendant N elso11, in permit-
ting the ame11dme11t. Defendants did not interpose an 
objection to the Motion to Amern1 nnti1 the morning of 
the trial. 
ObYiously, the Court, nnder Rule 34 ( c) (1), conl<l 
have awarded attorneys' fe0s (";en though plnintiff had 
not proposed an amendment to the PrP-Trial Onler. rrhis 
said rule proviues that " ... p\·ery final jrnl~·:m0nt shall 
grant the r0li0f to whi('h th0 party i11 whOR0 fm·or it i" 
rendered is entitled, eYPn if tlw p~rt.\· line: not d0mamlt>d 
sueh rC'licf in his p1eaclings ... '' 
The Court mrnnlecl attonwys' f0es to plaintiff on 
the Indemnity Agre0mc•nt CF>;-. P-1 ), whieh proYided: 
"In consideration of our (10liYering aluminum 
bridge rail to Bomaec, Tne. on your johsite, we ask 
that you gm1rm1tee pn:--·ment of our invoiee ... 
and that 1!'r br affnrdf'd /Jrnfer-tion 1111rlrr yn11r 
bond." (Emplrnsis ad(l<'fl) 
Protection under the honcl allows statutor:· attor-
neys' fees - the Court reasoned that the Inclemnit~· 
Agreement granted nothing less to th0 plaintiff than thP 
attorneys' fees allowable b:· statute under defendant N01-
son Brothers' bond. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO AWARD A REARONABLE ATTORNF,YR' 
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FEE TO DF~FENDANT, INDUSTRIAL IN-
DEMNITY COlHP ANY. 
Defendant, Industrial Indemnity Company, repre-
spnkd by the same counsel, misconstrues 14-1-8. Attor-
1wys' fees are awarded to the party bringing the action, 
if lw wins, and not to the party who does not bring the 
act ion, if he wins. If the party bringing the action loses, 
}ip f(ets no attorneys' fee. 
The pre\'ailing party in the action was the plaintiff, 
aml not the defendant, Industrial Indemnity Company. 
Assume for argument, plaintiff won on Count I :md on 
( 
1ou11t II - \rnuld the Court ha Ye awarded attorneys' 
f c·<·s to plaintiff on ho th Counts - obYiously not. And, 
too, attorneys' fees are taxed as costs under Rule 
.)4(d) (1) to the pre\'ailing party, unlPss the Court nt71er-
1r i.c;c r1 i rccf s. Here, the preYailing party who brought 
th<> action was plaintiff, and the Court so directed the 
attorneys' fees. The matter of attorneys' fees \\'aS com-
plet<>l.'' and exhaustiYely argued to the Court and the 
(\mrt, acting within its discretion, mrnrcled same to the 
pn'"\'ailing plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lo\ver court is supported by the 
<·,·i<lt•nre and the law and should he affirmed. 
Respectfully submit te(l, 
ALLAN E. l\f ECH.A M 
CLYDE, 1\fECHk'.\[ & PRATT 
~51 South State Street 
Salt Lake Cit:'. Utah 84111 
Attor11r1/.<: for RPs1w11denf 
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